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Contracting Margins? Liquid 
International Migration in the Pacific
John Connell1
Migration has had a long history in the Pacific, with Pacific islanders 
sometimes regarded as particularly mobile people, within a sea of islands that 
covers a third of the planet (Hau’ofa, 1994). In the last half century, there has been 
both accelerated international migration, especially from the smaller Polynesian 
and Micronesian states, and rural-urban migration, with declining populations in 
national peripheries and growing high density urban concentrations. Migration 
has taken increasingly diverse forms, as it has gone from temporary to more 
permanent, unskilled to skilled and organized by households and governments. 
That increased flexibility, diversity and also individualization, and the uncertainty 
and instability that is attached to this, despite more open options, can be seen 
as a form of “liquid mobility” (Kymlicka, 2015): an apt phrase in an island realm. 
It is argued here that even in some of the most remote islands in the world the 
rationale, outcomes and consequences of migration are not necessarily distinc-
tive, but epitomise two themes of “liquid mobility” hitherto more evident in 
Europe: distinctions between permanent and temporary migration are breaking 
down, with outcomes of varying precariousness, and this is undesirable for soli-
darity and equity. Liquid migration has followed more flexible labour markets, 
looser family relationships, cheaper travel and legal restrictions on permanency. 
Critically, these trends have accompanied slow economic growth in the region, 
the inability to create adequate numbers of jobs in the formal sector, steady 
population growth and rising expectations of what constitute adequate lives 
and livelihoods. While migration has long been primarily an economic phenom-
enon, social, political and environmental factors are also significant, and climate 
change will intensify future pressures for migration.
This overview focuses on the smaller islands, where economic opportu-
nities are particularly limited and environmental challenges are mounting, to 
examine the opportunities and constraints that have influenced contemporary 
development and migration, and which offer a microcosm of broader changes 
in the region, where migration is one part of a wide-ranging deterritorialisation 
(Connell and Corbett, 2016). It further emphasises the three states in the region 
that are entirely composed of atolls, Kiribati, Tuvalu and the Marshall Islands, 
where vulnerability to both economic and environmental threats is substantial, 




where migration is increasingly important and the margins of settlement are 
fading.
Development Challenges
Migration is a function of development, disadvantage and opportunity. 
Within the Pacific region enormous differences exist between those Pacific 
island states (PICs) with very high population densities — on less fertile land — 
as in the atoll states (notably 390 people per sq km in Tuvalu) compared with the 
much lower densities in the larger, high island, Melanesian states of Papua New 
Guinea (PNG) (with twenty people per sq km), Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. 
Average annual population increase in the PICs is around 2% but this varies 
widely. It is greatest in Melanesia, reaching 2.2% in PNG, and lowest in Polynesia 
and Micronesia, where the impacts of international migration are significant, 
and several states have falling populations.
Fertility rates remain relatively high in most PICs, resulting in large numbers 
of young people who require education, training and job opportunities, while 
high teenage fertility rates are linked to poor education and unemployment. 
Creating employment is a regional priority. There is extreme competition 
for jobs, high levels of youth unemployment that have contributed to social 
tensions in some urban centres and pressures for migration. In most PICs, more 
than half the population are aged below twenty-four. Relatively few people by 
number and proportion have post-school (tertiary) education and training, which 
leaves shortages for skilled positions, and potential migrants without the skills 
to access good jobs elsewhere.
An economic rationale for migration is partly a function of limited economic 
growth in the region, the outcome of significant and well-known constraints to 
economic development in small island states. Conventional economic develop-
ment has been limited through a combination of factors including small popu-
lations, scarce resources, remoteness, fragmentation, susceptibility to extreme 
events (especially cyclones) in fragile environments, and vulnerability to external 
economic shocks, which have contributed to a distinctive dependence on aid 
and imports. Further constraints include high communication, insurance and 
energy costs, irregular international transport volumes (and uneconomic routes 
and loads), disproportionately expensive public administration and infrastruc-
ture, scarce local skills, problems of matching skills and jobs, limited domestic 
capital, small domestic markets and few opportunities for economies of scale. 
Entrepreneurialism is stifled by the lack of skills, capital and contacts, but also by 
scarce opportunities, beyond small-scale services. Public administration is costly 
and inefficient, and in most PICs, provision of services — especially transport — to 
remote areas has worsened rather than improved. Relatively generous overseas 
aid and remittances have not compensated for such cumulative disadvantages. 
These constraints have resulted in narrow export specialisation and market orien-
tation, so that export prices and foreign exchange earnings can fluctuate consid-
erably and alarmingly. Manufacturing is conspicuous by its absence and without 
backward linkages to the agricultural or fisheries sectors. Weak economic growth 
has meant that the numbers of school-leavers, and thus potential entrants to the 
workforce, exceeds the number of jobs created (Connell, 2013).
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Economic development has been disappointing in the more or less half 
century since independence. Agriculture has produced the bulk of exports 
for most PICs but in this century has proved more difficult under a regime of 
increasingly free trade. Fisheries offer existing and future prospects, dependent 
on international negotiations, while tourism offers options for some, set against 
the tyranny of distance and intervening opportunities that has resulted in 
tourism being trivial in the atoll states. High islands — that make up almost all of 
Melanesia (Fiji, PNG, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu) and Polynesia (Samoa and 
Tonga), though islands are smaller there, have more development opportunities 
than the more remote atoll states, where opportunities are particularly scarce.
Migration has largely been a response to perceived socio-economic inequal-
ities, that in recent years have been accentuated by both a rise in expectations 
of incomes and living conditions and greater familiarity with circumstances in 
overseas countries. Changing aspirations, the increased necessity and desire 
to earn cash, a preference for regular employment, and distaste for agricultural 
work have gradually given migration a more obvious economic rationale: a 
movement in search of wage and salary employment, scarce or absent at home.
Rural-Urban Migration and Urbanisation
Rural-urban migration is now mainly a Melanesian phenomenon, but is 
also substantial in the three atoll states, and is something of an alternative to 
international migration, where that cannot be achieved. Towns and cities have 
grown rapidly in the years since independence, and most urban residents are in 
Melanesian cities and towns. Urban birth rates are high, and a growing propor-
tion of urban residents are now of a second or higher generation with few ties 
to “home” areas and limited ability and will to return (Petrou and Connell, 2017). 
Population densities are highest in capital cities despite the active discourage-
ment of urban migration and residence. Notions that Pacific islanders are or 
should be rural people have been difficult to displace (Connell, 2011).
Virtually since independence, urban populations have increased faster than 
those in rural areas, through a combination of rural-urban migration and urban 
fertility, posing challenges for planning, land use, water and sanitation, housing 
and general infrastructure, as well as the need for effective social, health and 
employment policies (Connell, 2013 and 2017b; Mecartney and Connell, 2017). 
This has resulted in “over-urbanisation” characterised by high unemployment 
rates (typified in a “youth bulge”), inadequate housing and services, alongside 
significant and intensified environmental problems. Social problems including 
ill-health, domestic violence, theft and alcohol abuse have become more signif-
icant. Land shortages are an accelerating urban and coastal phenomenon, 
alongside land tenure disputes and conflicts, resulting in increasing numbers of 
informal settlements on unsuitable land.
Throughout the region, greater pressure is being exerted on coastal 
resources: especially as populations increase, because of the desire for access to 
services, and to land suitable for development (whether for agriculture, tourism 
or infrastructure). All urban centres (outside PNG) are coastal, contributing to 
a “coastal squeeze” that has put pressure on water resources and agricultural 
land, led to the clearance of mangroves, polluted lagoons, reduced the habitat 
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of coastal fisheries, and increased the potential for coastal erosion. As urban 
centres have grown, newer migrants and newer housing areas, often informal, 
have located in marginal sites that are vulnerable to hazard. Many urban 
residents have few sources of income, no legal residential status and no security 
of tenure, limited access to services and live at high densities, the combination 
of which poses social problems and health risks. Within parts of Tarawa and 
Majuro, population densities have approached those in Hong Kong. In fragile 
urban atoll environments especially, high population densities challenge water 
supply systems, sanitation, and waste management and present serious envi-
ronmental management problems. Economic growth is too limited to mitigate 
or manage such problems, hence interest in international migration has conse-
quently grown. The combination of high population growth rates and fertility, 
few employment prospects and inadequate living conditions emphasises the 
economic rationale for migration.
International Migration
Migration has long been a feature of Pacific existence, since nineteenth 
century “blackbirding”, the initially forcible kidnapping of men, to work on 
plantations from Hawaii to Australia, and to mines, from Chile to Palau (e.g. 
Maude, 1981). It was particularly significant for the atolls where domestic oppor-
tunities were scarce. By the end of the nineteenth century, in remote atolls like 
those of Tokelau, “the idea of permanent migration, involving a severance of 
many ties with the home island and of seeking one’s fortune elsewhere, is well 
established in […] life and thought. For the past seventy years or so it appears 
to have been accepted that some of nearly every group of siblings must tahe 
(‘emigrate’) simply because the local resources are seen as insufficient” (Hooper 
and Huntsman, 1973, 403-404). Although most migration was temporary, it was 
already underpinned by the desire to benefit both the welfare of the migrants, 
and of family members who remained at home. Twentieth century migration was 
more localized in Melanesian plantations and, over time, to scattered mine sites, 
especially Banaba and Nauru. It remained only exceptionally permanent.
International migration effectively began in the 1960s, particularly from 
Samoa, after its independence in 1962, spurred by the global long boom, 
demand for employment and the arrival of jet transport, mostly to metropolitan 
states (New Zealand and the United States). Tonga soon followed, along with the 
Cook Islands. That relieved population pressure and initiated a modern phase 
of remittances back to the islands. Intendedly temporary, migration gradually 
became more permanent. With rare exceptions, such as the immigration that 
followed the late 1960s nickel boom in New Caledonia, a lack of intra-regional 
migration was indicative of limited island economic development.
This process resulted in Tonga and Samoa becoming dependent on remit-
tance flows to a greater extent than almost any other country. So significant has 
international migration become that, in Polynesia at least, families created small-
scale metaphorical “transnational corporations of kin”, by seemingly allocating 
family members to different countries, while migration became so common it 
was part of a “culture of migration” where migration is normative and reflects 
economic imperatives (Connell, 2008). Over time acquiring marketable skills has 
played a valuable role in enabling migrants to gain better jobs, and migration 
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has been of more evidently skilled migrants, such as teachers, health workers, 
and also sportsmen (Connell, 2009). Losses of skilled labour have become 
serious in several PICs, with especially small states losing disproportionately 
more skills than larger states. The loss of skilled workers has raised questions 
about whether migration constitutes both a brain drain of unacceptable propor-
tions that hampers national development, and a brain-waste as some fail to gain 
commensurate employment in destinations. Limited return migration has not 
remedied this problem and remittances may not always compensate for skill 
drains.
Most migration has been of individuals and later families, moving to metro-
politan states, especially New Zealand, and with many becoming permanent 
migrants. Several migrant generations now exist there and in other metropol-
itan states. By contrast international migration from PNG, Solomon Islands and 
Vanuatu is rare. That has partly resulted from different colonial relationships. 
Typically, migration has largely followed “colonial” lines, notably from much of 
Micronesia to the United States (enshrined in the Compacts of Free Association, 
when Palau, Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) and the Marshall Islands 
acquired independence) and from several Polynesian PICs to New Zealand. 
The three Compact states, Cook Islands and Niue all chose not to gain full 
independence since migration opportunities might has been lost. Conversely 
Kiribati and Tuvalu, and the Melanesian states, were latecomers to migration, 
without migration corridors to the United Kingdom, Australia or elsewhere. 
Nevertheless, migration from PICs gradually extended, diversified and became 
more skilled, with the same rationale but some new entrants, notably Tuvalu.
Structural circumstances have changed. Most PICs now benefit from 
some preferential arrangements, notably in New Zealand, whether permanent 
migration opportunities (the lotteries of New Zealand and the United States) 
or schemes for temporary employment (invariably in agriculture) and/or for 
training in particular activities. Since 2002, New Zealand has offered a Pacific 
Access Category, which allocates places to a range of Pacific island countries. 
It offers 1,100 places a year to Samoa, 250 places a year to Tonga and Fiji, 
and seventu-five to migrants from both Kiribati and Tuvalu, but applicants are 
only granted a visa if they receive a job offer from New Zealand, a significant 
constraint for atoll states like Tuvalu (Kagan, 2016b). Demand exceeds supply.
The outcome of these international migration flows has been a substantial 
population of Pacific islanders in the metropolitan states bordering the Pacific. 
Currently, almost a million Pacific-born people live elsewhere, compared with 
a resident population of about 11 million, three quarters of whom are in PNG. 
Second and third generations swell these numbers significantly. By 2010 some 
850,000 people of Pacific ethnicity or ancestry lived in the four main Pacific Rim 
migrant destinations: New Zealand (350,000), Australia (150,000), USA (300,000) 
and Canada (50,000). Ultimately migration in search of superior livelihoods is a 
continuation of past practices, where jet planes are faster, more effective and 
travel greater distances than canoes. That is abundantly true of atolls and the 




Migration has had massive economic significance. Over generations 
migrants are well placed to contribute to development at home through their 
familiarity with needs, and remittances contribute both directly and indirectly 
to welfare and human capital formation. Remittances, whether from more or 
less permanent migrants, especially overseas, or from seasonal workers, are of 
enormous and growing importance, even in the smaller islands of Melanesia, 
where they have contributed to the emergence of a “singaut economy” 
(Rasmussen, 2015; Hayes, 1993; Wilson, 2013; Petrou and Connell, 2017). Both 
unskilled and skilled migrants sustain remittance levels at high levels, over long 
time periods, often more than twenty years, while skilled migrants may also 
provide advice (“social remittances”) on education, health and other matters 
(Connell and Brown, 2004; Brown and Connell, 2015). Remittances have made 
a very significant contribution to improved housing and water supplies, better 
access to health and education, more modern forms of consumption, such as 
solar panels and generators, and small-scale services such as bars or petrol 
stations, small stores and taxis. Remittances have enabled some diversification 
out of agriculture, an increased flexibility of livelihood choices, and over time a 
reduction in both poverty and inequality (Brown, Connell and Jimenez, 2014). 
Remittances also support local organisations (especially churches) and local 
needs, such as recovery from cyclone damage and other hazards.
As international migration has become of greater significance, so remittance 
flows are larger, especially in comparison with aid flows, and more stable than 
other sources of national and household finance. Remittances compensate in 
the aftermath of crises and disasters, whether physical (especially cyclones) or 
economic, being counter-cyclical, in response to economic and environmental 
shocks (Le De et al., 2013). Growing recognition of the value of remittances 
has brought new institutional interest in managing flows and “harnessing” 
remittances for financing investment and economic growth. Remittances have 
become a new “development mantra” (Kapur, 2005), in a climate of aid fatigue, 
uncertainty about private investment, the extent of international migration and 
the propensity in some countries to train workers for migration. They constitute 
an effective, informal, family-based system of social protection for migrants’ 
families. At the same time, they may help to sustain a “migration syndrome”, 
while imposing sacrifices on migrants.
Remittances are such a substantial component of most small PICs that these 
microstates have been described as having MIRAB (Migration, Remittances, 
Aid and Bureaucracy) economies, an acronym first devised for Kiribati, Tuvalu, 
Tokelau and the Cook Islands (Bertram and Watters, 1985), but which is now 
more broadly relevant. Tonga and Samoa are within the top twenty countries in 
the world in terms of the contribution of remittances to gross domestic product 
(GDP). Sustained remittances are crucial for national development and are likely 
to become more important in the future, even in a global context of substantial 




The Pacific includes some of the most vulnerable islands and countries in the 
world, increasingly threatened by climate change. Rising sea levels and more 
intense storms and cyclones pose risks to coastal settlements, water resources, 
plants and human health (Connell, 2013). Low-lying atolls are prone to a range of 
hazards, from cyclones to tsunamis, and islanders are less easily able to mitigate 
such hazards in small islands, or, without high ground, retreat from them 
(Connell, 2015). More than 150 populated atolls are in the Pacific, with the three 
atoll states most at risk, being exclusively composed of atolls scattered over a 
vast expanse of ocean, and which have weak economies, restricting national 
ability to respond and cope domestically. Atoll states are particularly affected by 
the tyrannies of distance. Migration and resettlement within the Pacific region 
are limited, primarily because economic and employment opportunities are 
absent and appropriate, accessible land is scarce. Kiribati and, to a lesser extent, 
Tuvalu, unlike the Marshall Islands (and Tokelau), have no significant ex-colonial 
ties or overseas diaspora populations, hence have no “beachhead” populations 
overseas with whom to build migration bridges, and fewer assured sources of 
remittances.
The more distinctive problems of atoll states include intermittent water 
shortages, poor soils, and a “transport stranglehold” that has been a constraint 
to development, bypassing many atoll islands. The capital cities of Funafuti, 
Majuro and Tarawa, all now holding more than half the nations’ populations, 
after substantial internal migration, are particularly at risk because of high-den-
sity, relatively poor migrant populations in low-lying, marginal coastal areas. In 
Tarawa urban problems have reached crisis proportions: a “perfect storm” of 
economic problems intensified by environmental changes and extreme pressure 
on scarce resources (Storey and Hunter, 2010). Continued rural-urban migration 
has increased the vulnerability of these urban islands, as physical changes 
(such as causeway construction and sand and gravel mining) further threaten 
the “natural” environment. Many such marginal areas have only been recently 
settled, hence the poor are more likely to be at risk, yet they are less easily able 
to cope.
The converse of the extremes of urbanisation in the atoll states is depop-
ulation of the “outer islands”, in itself a relatively new concept in the Pacific, 
as employment is scarce, skilled workers are reluctant to be posted there and 
service delivery is limited (Connell, 2013). Almost every Pacific atoll, other than 
the three urban centres, has lost population in this century. Both Tuvalu and 
Tokelau have declining populations. Where migration opportunities are blocked, 
for whatever reason, then livelihoods are actually threatened, as in the densely 
populated Carteret Islands in PNG (Connell, 2016). The present and future of 
atolls and atoll states is of particular consequence in the region, because of 
the significance of economic challenges, but also because of the imminence of 
anticipated environmental threats to livelihoods, with ongoing climate change.
While migration even in the atoll states remains primarily an economic 
phenomenon (Shen and Gemenne, 2011; Shen and Binns, 2012; Connell, 2016), 
environmental factors may gradually become more significant, especially if 
changes become catastrophic. Since 2015 cyclones in Vanuatu and Fiji, and 
114
John Connell 
volcanic eruptions in Manam (PNG) and Ambae and Ambrym (Vanuatu) have 
proved catalysts for migration. Tsunamis, as in the Solomon Islands in 2007 and 
Samoa in 2009, have had similar but more localised effects. Only uninhabited 
islets have already succumbed to environmental change yet climate change, by 
stimulating more frequent and more intense cyclones, is likely to be a factor in 
contributing to “slow onset” migration and quests for resettlement.
Resettlement
Past resettlement schemes in the region provide unpromising precedents. 
Resettlement programmes have existed in the Pacific at least since the 1900s 
when people from some FSM atolls were formally relocated on Pohnpei after 
cyclones. In the 1930s people from Kiribati were resettled in the Solomon Islands 
and in Fiji. These international movements, of people experiencing drought and 
reduced livelihoods, occurred within and between British possessions in colonial 
times. While the resettlement of Banabans in Fiji has been relatively successful, 
since an “empty” island without local claimants was available and at the time 
involved no more than about 1000 people, seventy years later, uncertainty still 
reigns over land tenure (Connell and Tabucanon, 2015). Otherwise most reset-
tlement after environmental hazards, mainly volcanic eruptions and tsunamis 
(and also forced migration from military and mine sites), has been largely 
unsuccessful (Connell, 2012; Connell and Lutkehaus, 2017a and 2017b; McAdam, 
2014) with migrants seeking to return home, land disputes intensifying, friction 
occurring with nearby people and challenges in adapting to different ecological 
zones and cultures.
Resettlement of Manam and Carteret Islanders in PNG, has been typically 
thwarted by “host” landowners, the impossibility of gaining adequate access 
to land and land rights and government inactivity, even after, in the case of the 
Carteret Islands, half a century of attempts, and in the case of Manam, urgent 
needs. Such relative failures in resettlement raise questions of citizenship, ethics 
and morality and bode poorly for future resettlement needs. The problems expe-
rienced by quite small populations moving short distances in similar cultural 
contexts are indicative of the potential future problems facing environmental 
migrants. Settlers have been perceived as outsiders and rival claimants to 
valuable coastal resources. Although Kiribati has purchased a small island in Fiji, 
for possible resettlement, the “welcome” that might be attached to migration of 
i-Kiribati is likely to be ambiguous.
Landowners have been increasingly reluctant to cede land to others, however 
moral and worthy their claims, even when they shared kinship ties or exchange 
relationships, especially as their own populations and needs have grown, and 
land has become more valuable. Neighbours are not necessarily friends. Without 
some significant political and cultural changes, there is little likelihood of effective 
resettlement within the Pacific region. The Carteret Islands and Manam are 
problematic precursors for the future of resettlement in the region. By contrast 
the resettlement of half the islanders from the Tokelau atolls, which was then 
experiencing cyclones and overcrowding, to New Zealand in the 1960s (Wessen 
et al., 1992), offers a more hopeful precedent for resettlement beyond the PICs 
themselves, albeit in colonial times. But international moves tend to be costly, 




If most migration from PICs, other than rare resettlement schemes, has been 
independent of government involvement and intervention (or even facilitation), 
as migration became more obviously a development strategy, governments 
began to intervene to develop and regulate distant employment opportunities. 
That was spearheaded by Kiribati and Tuvalu, first in developing mining oppor-
tunities in Nauru, for most of the twentieth century, and subsequently, beginning 
in the 1960s, with the establishment of national Marine Training Schools to 
enable workers to acquire the skills needed to obtain employment on merchant 
shipping lines. In this century that briefly extended to cruise-ships providing 
employment opportunities for about 120 I-Kiribati women, between 2004 and 
2012. Numbers were small and management was challenging (Kagan, 2016a) and 
the scheme eventually ended.
Kiribati and Tuvalu were unusual in training workers for migration as 
“seafarers”, initially men and subsequently also women. That instituted the start 
of greater interest in, and a wider process of, training people for migration to 
achieve what the former Kiribati President, Anote Tong, called “migration with 
dignity”, that is employment in occupations which enabled some degree of 
self-esteem and higher incomes, rather than low status, low income, entry-level 
positions, and are also likely to offer some permanency and prospects and 
enable a more substantial flow of remittances.
PICS without migration ties to metropolitan states have given increased 
attention to training workers for employment either overseas or at home. 
Vocational education has been upgraded in several countries. Two new initia-
tives in this century include the multinational Australia-Pacific Technical College 
(APTC) and the Kiribati Australia Nursing Initiative (KANI). The APTC enables 
Pacific islanders to gain Australian skills and qualifications in a variety of trade 
areas, that would enable better access to overseas labour markets, although in 
the first few years most graduates have remained in their home countries. KANI 
was a sectoral training scheme, where i-Kiribati nurses were trained in Australia, 
principally to remain there and generate remittances rather than transfer 
superior skills to Kiribati. It proved an extremely expensive programme, with 
doubtful benefits other than for the graduates, and was quite quickly cancelled, 
but international strategies have continued to evolve.
Seasonal Worker Schemes
Accompanying longer-term schemes for more formally skilled workers have 
been short-term temporary employment schemes introduced between PICs 
and Australia and New Zealand from 2007. Such schemes have been seen as 
potential prototypes that might be effective in addressing the need for migration 
as adaptation in the face of short term hazards and slow onset climate change.
Seasonal worker schemes in the Pacific were introduced in New Zealand in 
the 1960s, to give opportunities to Pacific islanders to work for short periods 
in agriculture and provide mainly harvest labour to farmers. However New 
Zealand faced substantial overstayer problems and the schemes were short-
lived (Macpherson, 1981). A new Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) scheme 
began in 2007 and was followed in 2008 by a similar Australian SWP (Seasonal 
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Worker Programme) scheme, both centred on the employment of agricultural 
workers for up to seven months in a year. New Zealand allows up to 9,500 
migrant workers in a single year, and although Australia had no cap, numbers 
have been much lower. Most independent PICs have been involved; Tonga and 
Vanuatu have taken greatest advantage of them, whereas Tuvalu and Kiribati 
have only been marginally involved, disadvantaged by distance and transport 
costs, unfamiliarity and the difficulty of obtaining visas and passports, with 
potential workers lacking some basic skills, English language proficiency and 
the ability to develop workplace links necessary to smooth migration (Bedford 
et al., 2010).
New Zealand’s RSE scheme has been seen as a success, for its role as a 
development initiative, and because access to income for Pacific Islanders is 
the cornerstone of a “triple win” scenario that benefits New Zealand, through 
filling labour shortages, benefits PICs, through the provision of employment, 
and benefits the RSE workers and their families. Distinct differences from the 
nineteenth century era of blackbirding are that demand exceeds supply and 
a growing number of workers are women (Connell, 2010). Australia provided 
rather fewer places, partly because it is more fragmented geographically and 
institutionally. The overall benefits have been mainly positive, despite some 
social costs (Gibson et al., 2014; Bedford and Bedford, 2010; Petrou and Connell, 
2018). That the atoll states have largely failed to benefit emphasizes that risk and 
opportunities are unevenly distributed and that despite the needs of relatively 
poor countries and households, they are not the main beneficiaries.
These temporary negotiated transnational schemes are now expanding and 
extending into non-agricultural areas such as tourism, where there are similar 
labour deficits. In 2017 Australia introduced a microstate visa for northern 
Australia, specifically for Kiribati, Tuvalu and Nauru  — the “orphan micro-
states”  — to provide opportunities for up to 250 citizens (around fifty per year 
over five years). By early 2019 Pacific islander workers had been deployed in 
tourism (in Great Barrier Reef hotels), caring, forestry and meatpacking. Demand 
in these sectors will continue to grow and will not be met by domestic workers. 
A long history has accompanied the possibility of increased numbers of PIC (and 
other) migrants being involved in care giving at a time when the unsatisfied 
demand for care-givers is steadily increasing and a high proportion of all jobs 
in caring are held by new migrants from a range of “non-traditional” source 
countries (Negin et al., 2016). Small numbers and administrative problems are 
indicative of the constant underlying structural problems for small, remote 
nations engaging with distant and uncertain labour markets, especially where 
metropolitan countries are urged to “look after their own” and are distrustful 
of short-term migrants becoming more permanent (which caused the collapse 
of the 1960s schemes). However, unlike agricultural employment, vacancies are 
emerging in areas that require more skills beyond those currently held by most 
Pacific islanders, but are potentially more long-term.
On a regional scale, since most migration between Pacific island countries 
and metropolitan states has favoured Polynesian states (Samoa and Tonga) 
and, more generally, the states with colonial connections to New Zealand and 
the United States, and seasonal worker schemes favour countries that are not 
too distant from Australia and New Zealand, migration tends to proceed from 
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inequality and contribute further to inequality. Atoll states have been particularly 
disadvantaged.
Promoting the migration of workers, long important for various Asian 
governments, has become of greater Pacific significance. In every case this is 
primarily designed to increase the flow of remittances, but raises questions 
over whether people are more valued as migrants or as citizens and more 
basic questions about the use of remittances and the alternatives to a focus on 
migration. Migration is not a development panacea and a judicious combination 
of policies is needed to effectively maximise the benefits, for households and 
for countries. This must be based on reciprocal relationships between countries 
and between places of origin and destination, while remittance flows must be 
balanced against the social costs of migration and the skill drain that may be 
involved. That is crucial in the atoll states where skilled human resources are 
scarce and migration appears ever more valuable.
Conclusion
Despite the growing significance of government intervention and regulation, 
throughout the PICs most migration is of islanders making their own decisions, 
and either moving into already overstretched urban centres or to cities overseas. 
Pacific people have used a multitude of strategies to achieve mobility: kinship, 
lotteries, the PAC, national agreements, temporary work schemes and simple 
illegal overstaying. Simultaneously government interventions in favour of 
migration (not always with dignity) have increased, and been oriented, at least 
by Australia, in a most recent phase, to the particular needs of very small atoll 
states. The value of remittances has shaped a substantial outward urge — at a 
time of aid fatigue and stagnant economic growth  — that has drawn in PICs 
hitherto less involved with international migration. In the context of globaliza-
tion and technological advancements, Pacific peoples are now more mobile 
than ever, travelling over greater distances and more frequently during their 
lives, partly a “liquid mobility” associated with the growing visibility of “floating 
populations” that stay temporarily (Engbersen, 2016). Environmental change is 
likely to enhance all these trends as the liquidity of migration increases further.
While the diversity of migration possibilities has increased, the legal rights 
and entitlements of Pacific island migrants have tended to decline — including 
the right to stay  — exemplifying a new stratification and inequality within 
migration. Foreign migrants are all too likely to be seen as foreign workers on 
temporary visas, easily able to be replaced and removed and denied citizenship 
and residential status: a new precarity (Underhill and Rimmer, 2015; Petrou 
and Connell, 2017). Temporary agricultural workers are denied permanency but 
encouraged to return every year, in order to take advantage of their acquired 
skills, becoming “permanently temporary” and constantly floating, a situation 
that does nothing for equity, challenges the etymology of “guest” workers and 
may enhance domestic problems.
A quarter of a century ago when climate change was just beginning to be seen 
as a potential threat to low-lying Pacific islands, one geographer, in an article 
entitled “Earth’s Empty Quarter”, feared that at the end of the present century 
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“almost all the descendants of today’s Polynesian or Micronesian islanders will 
live in Auckland, Sydney, San Francisco and Salt Lake City. Occasionally they 
may recall that their ancestors once lived on tiny Pacific islands, [now] lonely 
Pacific islands, set in an empty ocean” (Ward, 1989: 245). While some islands — 
all atolls — have been depopulated in the last century, it is a gloomy and unlikely 
prediction but it will take more effective policies and practices at several scales 
to ensure it does not become closer, and that, in Melanesia especially, urban 
concentrations are not excessive.
Atolls remain most at risk, but far from exceptional (Rallu, 1981; Connell, 
1983), with atoll states characterised as weak and fragile where service delivery 
to remote areas and islands (where employment opportunities are usually 
particularly scarce) has worsened, resulting in selective and accelerated 
migration from outlying areas and outer islands. As long ago as 1954 Osborne 
(1966: 49) vividly recorded the “last days” of tiny Merir atoll (Palau): “the island 
is dying… the women are too old to cultivate taro in any quantity and the men 
cannot keep the coconut groves cleared”. Other Palau atolls, such as Sonsorol, 
have effectively followed suit (Walda-Mandel, 2016) having failed to go from risk 
to resilience but chosen to leave a subsistence lifestyle for a more diverse and 
loosely modern livelihood. As aspirations increase, the human margins have 
gradually faded.
Land issues have constrained internal migration and resettlement throughout 
the Pacific region, and access to land is more difficult now than at any time in the 
past (other than in large private sector land grabs). Only Fiji offers some resettle-
ment opportunities. Established local, regional and transnational networks ease 
processes of migration and settlement. Slow and steady migration and reset-
tlement, the ability of the people themselves to participate in decision-making, 
the possibility of some people remaining at home and, in the end, the greater 
capacity of local people to resist displacement and mitigate environmental 
change, so the greater the chance of success. Yet there is always a danger of 
being too slow. Time and timing are of the essence. International migration is 
increasingly essential.
Demand for migration is likely to become more important in the future for 
a combination of social, economic and environmental reasons. PICs will need 
to maintain and develop strategies that most effectively benefit from all oppor-
tunities for migration, and to seek out other possible opportunities. Given the 
complex nature of the relationships between migration, climate change and 
socio-economic development, at various scales, a challenge for countries and 
the region as a whole is where best to focus policy (Connell, 2017a). Whatever 
forms of migration develop it is necessary to create an attractive political, social 
and economic environment that encourages migrants to remain in contact and 
be involved in their home countries and islands, to return and to remit and, if 
feasible, to make investments there. National strategies in the PICs are very 
slowly evolving in this direction. Yet, as migratory numbers and aspirations 
have grown, reaction to migration has become particularly strident, evident in 
Brexit and Donald Trump’s call for a wall between the United States and Mexico, 
a lack of solidarity and empathy, highlighting the political ground-swell against 
globalisation, immigration alongside protectionism and virulent anti-immi-
gration in Australia, marked by draconian policies towards refugees. In this 
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century, Australia has tended to cut back its liberal provisions for migration 
from New Zealand, as that increasingly brought Pacific islander migrants who 
had first stayed in New Zealand and acquired citizenship there (Hamer, 2014). 
Concessional schemes for Pacific islanders have had no obvious place in 
Australia or the United States.
Migration has never been easy and there has rarely been a good time to be 
a migrant but the considerable extent of global opposition to migration seems 
unlikely to decline in the near future. Borders are hardening and legal restric-
tions are increasing, at the same time as both greater demand and support for 
temporary migration, where flexible labour markets offer neither stable nor 
well-pad jobs: the basis of liquid migration. It is in this context that the present 
and future of Pacific migration exists. On the margins especially, few opportu-
nities exist for PICs and their residents to establish some degree of “migration 
with dignity” — where migration meets a range of needs and can be suitably 
planned and managed — but the politics of migration will become increasingly 
sensitive and critical. These issues are likely to become more challenging in 
the face of climate change, despite uncertainties about its future impact. If PICs 
can develop national economies where the “rush to migration” and popula-
tion growth can be slowed, and harmful environmental change mitigated and 
reduced, migration strategies will be rather less urgent, and less likely to end in 
precarity. That does not seem imminent.
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Contracting Margins? Liquid International Migration in the Pacific
In the smaller Pacific islands especially, migration has a long history. In this 
century international migration has become more significant in Melanesia, 
more diverse in terms of destinations and occupation, more valuable to national 
economies through remittances and more likely to be permanent. Governments 
of the smaller Pacific island states have become increasingly involved in nego-
tiating migration strategies, as remittances have become more significant for 
national and household economies. Responding to scarce international oppor-
tunities has been particularly difficult in smaller, more remote states. In the 
coral island states outer islands are losing population. An economic rationale 
dominates migration but environmental changes are putting further pressure on 
the coral island states especially, and the margins of settlement in the Pacific are 
gradually contracting. Reversing these trends is unlikely to be imminent.
Des marges qui se rétrécissent ? La migration dans les eaux du Pacifique
En particulier dans les petites îles du Pacifique, la migration a une longue 
histoire. Au cours de ce siècle, la migration internationale est devenue plus 
importante en Mélanésie, plus diversifiée en termes de destinations et d’acti-
vités, plus précieuse pour les économies nationales grâce aux transferts de 
fonds et plus susceptible d’être permanente. Les gouvernements des petits États 
insulaires du Pacifique se sont de plus en plus impliqués dans la négociation des 
stratégies migratoires, les envois de fonds étant devenus plus importants pour 
les économies nationales et les ménages. Il a été particulièrement difficile de 
saisir les rares occasions qui se sont présentées à l’échelle internationale dans 
les États les plus petits et les plus éloignés. Dans les États insulaires coraliens, 
les îles périphériques perdent leur population. La logique économique domine 
la migration, mais les changements environnementaux exercent une pression 
supplémentaire en particulier sur les États insulaires coraliens et les marges 
de peuplement dans le Pacifique se contractent progressivement. Il est peu 
probable que l’on puisse rapidement renverser ces tendances.
¿Margen cada vez más estrecho? Migración en aguas del Pacífico
La migración tiene una larga historia, especialmente en las pequeñas islas del 
Pacífico. Durante este siglo, la migración internacional se ha vuelto más impor-
tante en Melanesia, más diversificada en términos de destinos y actividades, 
más valiosa para las economías nacionales a través de las remesas y con más 
probabilidades de ser permanente. Los gobiernos de los pequeños Estados 
insulares del Pacífico participan cada vez más en la negociación de estrategias 
de migración, ya que las remesas han adquirido mayor importancia para las 
economías y los hogares nacionales. Ha sido particularmente difícil aprovechar 
las pocas oportunidades internacionales que han surgido en los Estados más 
pequeños y distantes. En los Estados insulares de los corales, las islas perifé-
ricas están perdiendo su población. La lógica económica domina la migración, 
pero los cambios ambientales ejercen una presión adicional, particularmente 
sobre los estados insulares coralinos, y los márgenes de los asentamientos en el 
Pacífico se están reduciendo gradualmente. Es poco probable que estas tenden-
cias puedan invertirse rápidamente.
